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ABSTRACT
ZACHARY MARK CRUTHIRDS: PERSUASION AND RHETORICIN CABLE NEWS
COMMENTARY: philosophical and economic analysis
(Under the direction of Stephen Goforth)
There is currently a growing cynicism about objectivity in cable news reporting
and commentary, and there have been many allegations ofpandering and bias on the
part ofand concerning commentators on 24-hour news outlets. There have been
changing trends in how many American citizens acquire information and analysisfrom
these mediums—leading to what has been coined the '‘infotainment” ofcertain
comedians, extremists, and any network, corporation, or commentator who would give
consideration to giving a target audience what they desire or expect.
In thefollowing thesis, we will offer definitionsfor rhetoric and persuasion
founded in a type ofself-interested individual rationality which will have great
explanatory power in why the arguments and debates ofcable news commentators are
structured in specific ways. We will also briefly touch upon journalistic codes of
professional ethics while holding to Robert Nozicks theories ofsuch ethical principles
acting as a resistance to temptation. We then discuss the effect ofthis theory of
persuasion and rhetoric on our idea ofdemocratic discourse and its constituentfacts.
As a transitionfrom philosophical to more economic concerns, we then discuss
conceptions ofindividual rationality and how theyfit within our theoreticalframework of
democratic discourse and persuasion. We examine the possibility ofthe rationality ofan
agent not implying her knowledge ofan objectively correct answer. This, we will see.

leaves commentators much license toformulate sophistic argumentsfor the purposes of
targeting specific demographics and increasing ratings.
The ability being established, we will then construct a game theoretical model of
a marketfor cable news and commentary in order to show the behavior ofa rationally
acting cable news network within that market. I will make several simplifying
assumptions and outline the parameters ofour model in order to show that, under some
conditions, cable news networks have an economic incentive to target political
demographics. Coming to the end ofour discussion we make a summary ofthe
arguments and add some comments on our market model.
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Persuasion and Rhetoric in Cable News Commentary: philosophical and economic
analysis
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Topic and Relevant Issues
Reason and Ignorance, the opposites ofeach other, influence the great bulk of
mankind. Ifeither ofthese can be rendered sufficiently extensive in a country, the
machinery ofGovernment goes easily on. Reason obeys itself; and Ignorance submits to
whatever is dictated to it.”
-THOMAS PAINE,Rights ofMan
More than two centuries ago, the United States of America was founded on the
belief in the capacity for individual rationality, and its political structure was placed.
suspended, upon the hook of every citizen’s reasonableness. It may be argued the
government they erected was in some way committed to the hope that its citizens be
sufficiently similar to an idealistic model of an idyllic philosopher who makes only
justified decisions in political affairs—as he, in fact, does in life. In the very founding of
this nation, the many shapers and molders ofthe new order democracy made a large
commitment to the belief that citizens are rational and informed enough to make
competent decisions on an aggregate level. This faith stands closely related to ancient
Greek thought on the subject—specifically, Aristotelian theories on the accuracy of mass
decision-making.

The Founders took the normative ethic that the People should govern themselves
from writers such as Thomas Paine while accepting the practicality that the People are
able to govern themselves, more fundamentally, fi-om the example ofthe ancient Greeks
as well as the writings of Greek philosophers such as Aristotle. The Founders did not
take the leap of establishing a pure democracy as seen in ancient Athens, but they instead
opted for our present form ofrepresentative democracy where, if nothing else, the
collective judgment ofthe masses is relied upon in deciding who is capable of leading the
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country—often in a manner which parallels the will ofthe masses as a rational careerpolitician seeks reelection. Such participation by the citizenry takes part at some stage of
political decision making; thusly are all citizens participants in and stewards oftheir
government.

It would seem that, to some degree, it was their belief that the citizenry ofthe
Colonies would, on the whole,be able to make rational decisions when exposed to a
sufficient amount of relevant information and argument. Their presumption, however.
was that the decision-makers in their inchoate nation, the electorate, would be a group of
truth-seeking, educated men who were actively following the issues ofthe day .

Americans ofthe current political climate, however, would say the Colonial view
of who should vote in our democracy was incomplete as it excluded women,those who
did not own property, etc. This is because the mores of democracy have changed to some
extent since the original thirteen colonies broke away from England. We have constantly
increased the size ofthe election booth until it no longer consists of predominately
educated, informed citizens.

It would be difficult to argue that women or African Americans or the poor should
not be given suffrage within this current interpretation of the government established by
these founding statesmen. To do so would not serve the purpose of this examination. We
are merely to see that, in a growing world with an ever-increasing amount ofinformation
to be digested and with less informed and intellectually trained citizens casting votes,
American democracy has become a very messy, potentially dangerous enterprise thanks
* Provisions such as the electoral college do serve as safeguards against irrationality on the part of the
citizenry; however, one still sees some belief in the practicality of democratic government and the rule of
the citizens.
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in large part to the emergence ofcable news networks and their appertaining
commentary. We say that some citizens are less informed in that there is a trend in
consumers ofcable news—specifically, these viewers are beginning to watch
commentary and satire in lieu of objective news blocks.

Media is the lens through which the American voter views the world beyond her
own direct experience. It is the filter and distiller ofthose infinite variables of human
society—^without which many would be lost in a sea of indistinguishable information. In
fact, the public greatly relies on the media to obtain raw information and facts. That is
why America looks to newspapers, television, radio, and most recently, the Internet for
the most important information about the outside world and guidance on how to most
recisonably synthesize those data. Nowhere is argument for the importance of media
more easily defended than in our democratic society with its ties to individual fireedom.
individual rationality, etc. and with the special necessity it creates for the availability of
information.

Essentially, today’s ballot box includes every American citizen who is over the
age of 18, has never committed a felony, and has not been found mentally incompetent.
That translated into over 130 million Americans of300 million^ residents of the United
States voting in the 2008 presidential election (Barr, 2008 turnout shatters all records).
These voters helped determine the future ofthe entire nation by merely casting one vote,
one decision each. How do they make the choice between policies? How do they choose

^ This 300 million value also includes those not eligible to vote in the election, (e.g. children, those
convicted of felonies, foreign workers, etc.)
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between ideologies? How do they know which candidate to suspect of malfeasance?
Whom should they fear less, or even praise?

One American watches the news,reads a newspaper, and laughs at certain
campaign ads on her quest to find the facts. Upon receipt ofthe bare-bones ofthe matter,
she begins to formulate a decision between the two. Furthermore, she is reasonably
equipped to sift through marketing, mere opinion, and false dichotomies of talking
heads. She is capable of distinguishing simple news (i.e. pure information-seeking
dialogue) firom entertaining conunentary (e.g. deliberation or eristic dialogue)*. Yes, her
personal beliefs and values may enter into the equation. After all, she is only human and
is expected to make value judgments when moralizing about the direction of her country,
livelihood, etc.; such being the case, we still have that any decision is entirely her own.
She uses only the facts while synthesizing them as she chooses and critically assesses
arguments on all sides of a given issue. She is not the norm. She is the ideal ofsome
journalists who are misguided in their beliefin the usefulness ofthe paradigm of an
information-seeking and analytical audience. However, we see she is certainly not
common—arguably,her kind is hardly still, if ever it has been, extant— in modem
American society.

Another American voter has a system of beliefs and morality which enters into his
reasoning on the issues at hand, but he cannot or cares not to distinguish between raw
facts imcolored by analysis and data that have been through the spin cycle only to emerge
preprocessed and ready for mass consumption by a fast-food nation. Perhaps to him,the
views of a tmsted commentator pass as strong or valid arguments or do not require the
X

Tenns posited and defined in Walton’s Media Argumentation: Dialectic. Persuasion, and Rhetoric.
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same level of scrutiny as other sources. Perhaps, the commentator has passed the voter’s
initial scrutiny and has simply become more trusted, but even this does not avoid the
danger. In this case, many conclusions may be—often fallaciously—slid past any
reasonableness he may possess by pinning them onto his prior commitments and beliefs
as he holds his back to the unpalatable with arms full ofthe inexpendable. This is not the
active intellect and inquiry we would expect of our aforementioned ideal.

She hears a pundit, trying to find the reasoning behind the pros and cons of
healthcare reform in order to detect rational argument and be aware of ambiguous.
emotive talk; he often looks to the commentators in an attempt to assess the status of his
beliefs within the larger framework of an ever-changing society and is easily led by
means of his fear, simpleness, trust, etc. to conclusions he may not accept were he to
examine them independently or even rationally while keeping his commitments intact.
His interests may be expertly twisted, manipulated to coax him into accepting some rash
conclusion. He is the reason why commentary in the media can jeopardize our American
democracy in its archetypal form.

Much of contemporary theory on persuasion has these individual interests,
desires, and passions as central to the rhetoric of directing one agent or an entire mass
audience. In the late 19* and early 20* century Italian philosopher Carlo Michelstaedter
laid the groundwork for a theory of persuasion which has great application to bias and the
danger of mass persuasion in modem media and also is fundamental to contemporary
thought on persuasion. In his doctoral thesis, Michelstaedter argued that “persuasion”
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stems from and is reliant on the “^e^persuasion” ofthe agent who is to be persuaded^
This theory has weighty applications for the latter American, for he knows only that he is
persuaded of such and such a thing. It is the commentator’s goal to tell him what that
“such and such a thing in fact is.” A skillful commentator’s rhetoric is a means for
manipulating the directed efforts of self-persuasion ofthe individual egos in a mass
audience. It is clear that, if accepted, this has some very serious implications for the
rhetoric involved in news commentary. Does it necessarily promote “the rational
citizen’s formation of reasoned opinion” which was once the normative goal of network
news?(Baym,p. 64)

The definitions of persuasion and rhetoric which we will propose in this thesis has
its foundations in Michelstaedter, but it will equally equip us to account for both these
Americans. Our conceptions will, in fact, have great explanatory power to be applied to
all individuals deciding whether to accept a certain proposition, perform a certain action,
etc.

Television is perfectly equipped to tie such conclusions to the beliefs, fears,
sentiments, and desires ofthe public. We see that the highest rated cable news channels
are those which have sharp graphics, catchy bumps, and bombard their audience with
videos and images, and, most importantly, have big personalities handing out the news
with their own analysis and a “that’s the way it is” confidence—colored and prepackaged
for a target audience which shares a subset of such beliefs, assumptions, etc. It is a
highly personal and emotive experience compared with reading a simple news story in
the local gazette; it is more personal and exciting than hearing a smooth, metered voice
See Michelstaedter’s Persuasion and Rhetoric.
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merely reading off the points ofthe day’s news**. It is one thing to hear a debate on
capital punishment; it is another to see the suffering of a boy whose father is put to the
death penalty and later found to be innocent. It is well known to any propagandist that
exciting the emotions or increasing the endorphins creates fertile ground to instill new
beliefs, new values, new prejudices, new bias, or to further develop (often fallaciously)
prior commitments which can help in directing members of an audience toward their goal
by means of accepting your propositions with less chance of a critical examination on
their part.

There is a growing trend among Americans, that more and more voters are
watching commentary in place of what would be categorized as a “just the news” show.
The programming of cable news stations shows the networks are accommodating this
behavior as commentary is continuing the slow encroachment on traditional news blocks
between 5:30-6:30 p.m.^^ Commentary now often flanks so-called objective news
reporting. Does this trend undermine the assumption of a voter as actively seeking
information and argument—as was the original assumption of American government?

This is not to say, however, that news commentary can summarily discard
th

Americans’ affinity for logic and reason. Francis L. Wellman observed in the late 19
century that the dynamic of American juries was changing. Wellman espoused
demonstration as a form of persuasion. With an increase in urbanization and with an

increase in exposure to the outside world (i.e. more rapid exchange ofinformation), he
This may be seen in the ratings of CNN as their number of prime-time viewers has decreased some 40
percent since 2009—as network officials continue to support what they hold to be objective, platformneutral programming.(Calderone,“How to Fix CNN”,politico.com)
For an example, MSNBC’s weekday programming from 5:00-7:00 p.m. consists of Hardball with Chris
Matthews and The Ed Show. Fox News Channel’s during the same time block is filed by Glenn Beck and
Special Report with Bret Baier.
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found that juries were growing less inclined to believe lofty speech presented by an
erudite figure than to believe a proposition which they felt had been demonstrated. For
persuasive purposes, Wellman argued that American jurists desired to feel as ifthey had
reached a conclusion independently ofthe lawyer. They followed to the conclusion
rather than being instructed to the conclusion.(Wellman, p.21)

This is why television sometimes makes use of a pseudo-rational use ofrhetoric
as a means of persuasion. There is the perception ofsound deductive or strong inductive
logic if not its actual presence. We will discuss how commentators can prey on people’s
desire to think rationally and be justified in their beliefs as this thesis progresses. We will
find out frighteningly effective appeals to notions such as “common sense” can turn the
tide in an argument. Through changing reason or wisdom into an ad affectis appeal—^that
is, an appeal to the emotions—commentators can manipulate logic and education itself to
coax the audience to unknowingly walk across the rickety bridge of a fallacy. Likewise,
using Aristotle’s De Sophisticis Elenchis, we will see that much ofthe argumentation
used in political commentary is sophistical in nature.

“That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but
are not is evident...there exists both reasoning and refutation that
is apparent but not real. Now for some people it is better worth
while to seem to be wise, than to be wise without seeming to be
(for the art ofthe sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the
reality, and the sophist is one who makes money from an apparent
but unreal wisdom); for them, then, it is clearly essential also to
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seem to accomplish the task ofa wise man rather than to
accomplish it...

(Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis, Ch. I)

We shall see that the unfortunate truth ofthe matter is that sophistry can yield
higher ratings and more money. Traditional dialogues make use ofchain-arguments.
These are inductive and deductive arguments which are strung together to make a logical
clearing toward a particular conclusion. The difficulty lies in limited time, the
complexity ofthe issues discussed, and/or the audience’s lack ofintellectual interest or
training. This means arguments in a television setting are often abridged and simplified;
issues are partitioned and sliced up so as to make them easily manageable.

How much logical import is sacrificed for the sake of persuasion? How may
citizens reason with one another when only exposed to emaciated faux-arguments? If we
can show a pervading inclination toward sophistry in conflicts which cannot be easily
resolved and in which sophistry is used in different cases by different commentators to
reach different conclusions on the same issue, then we can show such commentary stands
as an affront to normative theories ofjournalism that would clamor to promote rational
discussion. Upon finding such a pattern, we will discuss the meaning for any hopes of
objectivity for a cable news network which includes commentary in its programming.

We begin with a more philosophical approach which focuses on laying down
several definitions for key concepts for later discussion. We offer definitions for
democratic government and democratic discourse before moving to our discussion of
persuasion and rhetoric. We will use these terms in discussing how commentators may
convert the complex argumentation ofchain arguments on a particular matter of political
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concern down to a digestible size and format so as to fit time constraints, make the
rhetoric more compelling, etc.

In our transition from philosophical theory to economic analysis, we will decide
on three criteria for a view to constitute a reasonable political view within the context of
a specific discourse. Continuing on this path ofthought, chapter 7 will focus on
individual rationality, preferred desires, and cognitive bias. This discussion with seek to
find any legitimate claim to the truth ofindividual rationality and to what degree one may
expect rational interaction between agents.

Setting matters of philosophy and psychology aside, as the last step in our
analysis we will construct a game theoretical model of a market for cable news
commentary. Making several assumptions on market structure and human psychology.
we will demonstrate the conditions under which a cable news network has an economic
incentive to target what we shall define as a significant political view. We will further
show that, under parameters we will outline, industry profit will be maximized only if the
number of significant political views is less than or equal to the number of cable news
networks.

“It is on great occasions only, and after time has been givenfor cool deliberate
reflection, that the real voice ofthe people can be known.”
—GEORGE WASHINGTON,Letter to Edward Carrington on May 1, 1796
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Chapter 2: DeHning Our Fundamental Qualities of Democratic Government after a
Brief Discussion of Civics Classes, Athenian Democracy, and Aristotle
“All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will ofthe majority is in
all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable...”
-THOMAS JEFFERSON
We cannot hope to effectively examine the effect ofcommentary on American
democratic discourse without first providing definitions for how we will use the terms
“democratic discourse” and “democratic government.” We will begin by briefly
discussing the way in which elements of democracy are defined in some basic high
school civics classes. Having a working grasp ofthe way in which many Americans
understand American government, we will provide a broadened context by offering a
historical example of democracy in the pure/direct democracy of ancient Athens.
Bringing together our historical account and the discussion of citizens’ education, we will
lastly look to Aristotle’s Politics to provide a sobering perspective on ideas of
democracy.
Being sure to remain true to our examples ofsuch government, we will then
offer our working definition of democratic government and democratic discourse based
upon some fundamental qualities we will find.
§2.1 Educating American High School Students
From infancy, Americans are surrounded with what teachers and parents.
preachers and historians, republicans and democrats often refer to as American
democracy. The People are conditioned to accept and whole-heartedly defend the
proposition that the structure and ordering oftheir government is categorically the best
available to a modem society. Such states are extolled as governments hinging upon the
fundamental principle that all men and women are in some way equal to one another in
14

worth or voice or some other measure offreedom.*
An American high school student is taught in a civics class that her government
has three main branches: the legislative, executive, and the judicial. Her instructor
speaks about the balance of powers and how it is meant to avoid the tyranny ofthe few.
She learns it is her birthright to have as loud a voice in the affairs ofthe United States
of America as any of her citizen counterparts around the nation. She is given the charge
to be a good citizen by staying informed and educated as her vote will soon help to
determine the direction ofthe country in a few short years or even a few short months.
There is discussion ofthe difference between a representative democracy and a
pure democracy and the student is given only a cursory view ofsuch unifying principles
which may allow us to categorize any democratic government.
In a democracy,the people administer the government themselves. These
'direct democracies” must be confined to small communities like the
ancient city-state of Greece. In a republic, the people’s representatives
administer the government, allowing it to be extended over a much larger
area...[The new American nation] was a democracy in the sense that it
derived its authority—its right to govern—from the people as a whole.
Madison’s new definition ofa republican government, therefore, also
could be defined as a representative democracy.

(Smith, p. 17)

The texts and web sites sampled for the purposes ofthis discussion have followed a very
Aristotelian formula. That is, these fimdamental principles revolve around (1)supreme

* This, of course, seems to imply that such freedom is equal in a quantifiable way. This is stated in order to
aid in understanding, and a thorough examination of whether such freedom is indeed quantifiable in some
real, non-arbitrary way is beyond the scope of our discourse.
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power being based on—or in some way determined by—the will ofthe majority and (2)
belief in individual freedom.^
These principles of majority rule and individual freedom do not break far from
mainstream trends in democratic theory. They are surprisingly compatible with and
essential to more than 2,000 years of philosophical discourse about democracy. The pair
can be found throughout Aristotle’s writings on statecraft as common
criteria/commitments of democracies; however, there are still problems here.
This is still insufficient information. What counts as a “supreme power” for the
majority? Any law—once demanded by a vast majority—may be repealed by the
Supreme Court where the members are appointed and not elected.
An instructor in such a civics class may respond that the will ofthe majority is to
be followed unless it interferes with individual freedom. There are volumes upon
volumes and years upon years of debate about what this “individual freedom” is in the
U.S. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11*, one ofthe major hot-button topics has
been the individual’s right to privacy. What excuses an encroachment on individual
rights in the United States of America? What must a citizen do, or permit, to in turn be
forfeiting his right to privacy? One argument is that there can be negative consequences
to always protecting some of these rights belonging to a part of citizenship.
To answer these questions would be beyond the scope and purpose ofthis chapter,
but the point is made. Whereas the experts, politicians, and jurists have difficulty and
find enough room for disagreement on these matters, we cannot but conclude that the
^ We the People: the Citizen and the Constitution and www.civiced.org.
^ Supreme Court justices are, ofcourse, not elected by majority vote; however, they are appointed by duly
elected officials. Thus, one may argue that such officials are indirectly decided by the majority, but the
sticky fact still remains that they, once on the bench, may refuse a demand by the majority through the
process ofjudicial review.
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average citizen is no more equipped to make an assessment^ The high school student
being prepared to vote is taught a term and fills it in great part with her own content.
This is why, despite such educational programs,some voting citizens make it to
the ballot box having an incomplete, rudimentary view of what their government really
is. They have only an elementary view of what kind of correspondence there is between
its construction, and the principles as well as practice of pure democracy. In some sense
it may be argued that some ofthis misimderstanding is a consequence ofthis education.
For this reason, we must begin with looking at the classical example of democracy,
ancient Athens. A comparison between American government and the pure democracy
ofthe city-state is the first step to drawing together a working concept of democratic
government. This is essential to our examination ofthe effect of news commentary on
democratic discourse in the U.S..
§2.2 True origins ofdemocracy
Despite recent discoveries which could suggest otherwise, it is traditionally taught
that democracy originated in Athens just 700 years after the beginning ofthe Iron Age.
In the ancient city-state of Athens, every citizen was entitled and expected to participate
directly in government, either through serving for a time in the assembly which was open
to all citizens or by serving as a government official in some other capacity. Ofthe few
official positions, some were filled by a vote ofthe assembly, but most were by simple
lot—thus, giving much equality ofchance to every citizen. This was direct democracy
® It might occur to the reader that individual rights should be defined by the majority, pursuant to our first
principle that supreme power rest with the majority. However, the United States is also a constitutional
representative democracy. The majority must make judgments, decisions, and mandates within the
confines ofthe Constitution. Further, the Constitution contains the Bill of Rights which is often the subject
of this debate. Due to this fact, it is not left to the majority to define such rights directly in a legal or
political sense. They may indirectly affect interpretation by voting for one elected official over the other
who will, in turn, participate in the Supreme Court appointment hearings.
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much closer to the picture seen in political and philosophical discussions ofpure
democracy.
This may seem to the contemporary reader to be a great deal ofresponsibility and
trust placed in the acumen of simple citizens, but we must understand several things
before making our comparison to contemporary democratic governments. Just as the
standard for citizenship (and eligibility to vote) has changed over time in the United
States, so too did the Athenian have different requirements to meet for full citizenship.
Citizens of Athens participated in a pure or direct democracy; however, these citizens did
not make up the majority ofthe adult population. It was an elite group which excluded
any women, metics, slaves, freed slaves, and men who had not completed military
training during adolescence. There was a complete cross-section ofsocio-economic
classes but less of an opportunity for citizenship relative to the population than is
currently afforded to the population ofthe U.S. In the

century B.C.E., approximately

40,000 inhabitants were citizens whereas there were approximately 160,000 people living
in Athens at the period—a figure which does not include women and children.(Hall,
“Ancient Greece Citizens”, ezinearticles.com).
Additionally, we must take into consideration the changing face ofthe world,
growing populations, increasing diversity, etc. With increases in technology and
diversity of religion, national origins, etc., issues which are the concern of contemporary
governments are becoming increasingly complex. If ever there were an age when
politicians must be comfortable having large staffs of experts in various fields, now is
that time. Ironically, it is becoming more difficult for many citizens to reach a reasoned
conclusion in matters of political discourse, despite the rapidity with which they are
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exposed to an increasing amount ofinformation jfrom around the world. This is the trend
we will soon examine. It seems, getting more information faster while being exposed to
the species of discourse found in some cable news commentary is making it increasingly
difficult for the American people to effectively process that information.
§2.3 Aristotle on Democracy
Even with less information exchange and a more elite group ofcitizens, the
structure of Athenian government cannot be taken to indicate a belief on the part ofthe
Athenians that each citizen was capable ofreasoning toward a wise choice of action or
policy in every decision in which he may cast a vote. Moving further, it does not need to
be the case that each citizen makes a wise decision on even most matters.
This is under the postulates of Aristotle’s view of democracy. According to the
Aristotelian theory of democratic discourse, a large group ofindividually prejudiced.
fallible individuals is able to make decisions toward the continuation ofthe state: “When
they meet together their perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with the better
class they are useful to the state... but each individual, left to himself, forms an imperfect
judgment.”(Aristotle, Politics, Bk III, 1281b 34-39) Despite his belief in the usefulness
of large groups of citizens, we may also find instances of Aristotle giving somewhat
cryptic definitions ofthe citizen he is discussing:
[The citizen we are attempting to define is] he who has the power to
take part in the deliberative or judicial administration ofany state [so that

he] is said by us to be a citizen ofthat state; and, speaking generally, a
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state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.
-Aristotle,Politics, Bk. HI, 1275b 19-21
When we inquire into this “power to take part in the deliberative or judicial
administration of any state” we must delve into its nature. Is the power to take part in the
governance of a state a mere possibility or opportunity? Does it refer only to those
directly participating? What is direct participation in the governance of a state? Could
there be degrees of participation such as the difference between, say, the power of a
senator to direct the state versus a tradesman voting in a senatorial election?
§2,4 Deciding a Definitionfor Democratic Government
We may look to ancient Athens for an example ofpure democracy, and we may
look to the United States of America for a species ofrepresentative democracy.
However, how may we define democratic government? What is the most basic quality or
principle shared by various species of democracies with which we are familiar?
These concepts of democracy and democratic discourse are indispensable to our
examination, so we must try to extract some general principle. We may construct a very
useful definition of democratic government as follows:
Let us call any government a democratic government if, in that government, there
are criteriafor citizenship such that any individual meeting those criteria may directly
take part at some essential stage ofcollective decision making within the state.
For Athenians serving in the Assembly, this point in the decision making ofthe state was
much closer to the day-to-day workings of the state. In the U.S., citizens are afforded this
opportunity in every election, referendum, etc.
This definition was more or less taken from the “Democracy” entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy which may be found at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/
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As a corollary term, we say that some measure, freedom,and proficiency in
democratic discourse are desirable components of any democratic government. We will
define democratic discourse as:
Democratic Discourse will refer to a discussion between citizens ofa state aimed
Qt understanding differing opinions, beliefs, and desires; it is also intended tofacilitate
information exchange and completeness ofinformationfor citizens to participate in
deliberation at our essential stage ofpolitical decision making. This careful delineation
ofpositions is to heighten the amount ofinformation and argumentation to which
participating citizens are exposed. In the practice ofdemocratic discourse, each citizen
will be equipped to identify assumptions, value-judgments, andfacts that go into making
any argumentfor or against a particular political view which they individually present
within the context ofthe democratic discoursefor the purpose ofadvancing his or her
respective political views. This discourse does not seek to reconcile differences between
citizens on matters ofvaluejudgments and assumptions. We merely askfor completeness
ofinformation and identification ofevery major component ofan argument.
The latter definition of democratic discourse sets a high standard of understanding
and communicative ability, but it is useful in that such discourse fits in nicely with a
Millian calls for the comparison ofideas as set out in On Liberty. We will see in chapter
5 that such a definition aids in finding the friction between ideas. It allows for the
elimination offallacy, and it enables us to eliminate any view or opinion which has an
internal contradiction. Namely,if interlocutors in such a discourse are able to and
actually do disclose all assumptions, value-judgments, and facts which go into their
formulation of an opinion, then we may revise or discount any opinion/view which has
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contradictory assumptions, value-judgjnents, or facts to which the opinion itself owes
some dependence.
It is worth noting that it is not the purpose ofthese definitions to best define these
concepts or to make a speaker-intent claim that this is what interlocutors mean when they
utter the terms. We merely present these definitions for clarification, as they will be used
regularly in our discussions to come. To participate in a thorough treatment ofideas of
democracy would be ancillary to the marrow of our discussion, so we define these terms
thusly and proceed to an examination ofthe purpose and ethics ofjournalism in
democratic government.

“A citizen ofAmerica will cross the ocean tofightfor democracy, but won V cross the
street to vote in a national election.
—BILL VAUGHAN,columnist and author
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Chapter 3: Dewey vs. Lippmann on the Role of Media in Democracy
“All ofus who professionally use the mass media are the shapers ofsociety. We can
vulgarize that society. We can brutalize it. Or we can help lift it onto a higher level.”
-WILLIAM BERNACH
Under our definition of democratic government from the previous chapter, we
begin to ask: If those participating in an “essential stage ofcollective decision
making” are citizens with trades and professions not necessarily directly associated with
the government,if many attend to their families and watch American Idol rather than
C-SPAN,if only a select few are officials ofthe state and therefore directly involved in
and witnesses to the ongoing fimctioning ofthe nation’s capital, then how are they to gain
the information and knowledge of current affairs needed to participate in a democratic
discourse with the goal of yielding a collective decision ofthe citizens?
Some of these questions and a general criticism ofthe media was at the epicenter
of one of the greatest debates on journalism in democracy in the history of the United
States. The 1920s was a time of significant questioning and cynicism in democracy.
This was a time following World War I and the world had seen the democracies of both
Germany and Italy falter and fail. There was a growing fear that propaganda would soon
be employed to corrupt the structure and purpose of governments. It was suspected that
this would lead to police states much like those seen in Europe during the period.
(Kovach and Rosenstiel, p. 21-22)
§3.1 Lippmann and Public Opinion
The debate on the merits and weaknesses ofdemocracy in a post-WWI world
would begin in earnest when the famous journalist Walter Lippmann first published his
Public Opinion and American philosopher and psychologist John Dewey put forward his
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critique of Lippmann’s bleak outlook on democracy in his “New Republic.” What one
sees in their disagreement is a fundamental difference in their assessment ofthe average
citizen’s rationality and ability to draw reliable conclusions from imperfect
representations of experience.
“Lippmann emphasized the disconnect between truth and the fictions we develop
to represent the truth.” (Whipple, p.l59). Firstly, news media must compress
facts and analysis into short time slots and more colloquial vocabularies. An example of
this kind of alteration may occur when a cable news network is reporting on the latest
report put out by the Federal Reserve on forecasting unemployment. Ifthe reporters and
commentators covering the story do not want to lose any viewers to complexity, they will
define terms if the meaning may not be clear to the average viewer while balancing with
a desire to make the content as easily apprehended by that viewer as possible. Along
these same lines, such a journalist or commentator leaves out more difficult areas ofthe
analysis in the report in an effort to convey the information which will be useful to
viewers who will be voting, looking for jobs, planning retirement, etc.
Lippmann argued that humans simplify and compress to create a pseudo
environment which allows them to make decisions. Further, much ofthese mental
pictures and compressed representations ofreality they receive from the media(Kovach
and Rosenstiel, p. 22). Citizens become spectators rather than participants in
democracy. Under this theory, society’s experts and journalists function as democracy’s
participants. These experts, writes Lippmann, constitute an elite within a democratic
government. “[These elites] will function to distill the complex social problems of a
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given time into an intelligible form so that political decision-makers can make informed,
rational decisions.”(Whipple, p.l60).
The issue which we encounter here is in how subjective value-judgments fit
within this framework. How is this possible if, at some point in political or economic
argumentation, a value judgment must be made? Should we also include figures such as
religious leaders in this elite within our democratic government? How does the media
highlight differences between existential matrices? Do commentators and pundits take
certain beliefs, value-judgments, fears, desires for granted as they try to help citizens
formulate their subjective mental images to manage realities in order to make decisions?
These very questions will be addressed more fully in the coming chapters as we set forth
a definition of persuasion and rhetoric while providing criteria for a what we will coin a
reasonable political view for a particular citizen to hold when she has a particular
information set and is participating in a particular democratic discourse.
The problem Lippmann observes here is that this process has a very dangerous
tendency to distort the truth. We are left asking, however, whether there is another means
by which voting citizens may access the information, expert opinion, analysis, etc. which
they may desire in order to make their decision at our “essential stage ofcollective
decision making.” Lippmann offers no clear alternative to this, no means by which
journalists may make democratic government in practice more closely match the ideal of
democratic government. The reader should not feel as if Lippmann has left out some
crucial step in his discussion, though. His writings were just as much critique of
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democracy as journalism. As John Dewey wrote, Lippmann’s Public Opinion was “the
most effective indictment ofdemocracy... ever penned.” (John Dewey, as quoted in
Kovach and Rosenstiel, p. 22).
§3.2 Dewey and “New Republic”
A more optimistic estimation ofthe worth of democratic government enters the
public dialogue with John Dewey’s critique of Lippmann,in his “New Republic.”
Dewey described logical inquiry, a process which every citizen undergoes, as a process
and attempt at determination of an indeterminate situation.(O’Connor,Indeterminate
Situation and Problem in Dewey’s Logical Theory). This inquiry, in Dewey’s sense, was
an art and science of drawing and formulating conclusions from out the subjective
continuum of experience.
In a period of great distrust of democratic processes Dewey argued that the goal
of democracy is not necessarily to efficiently manage a state’s affairs. Rather, democracy
was a means by which people may best develop their own potential(Kovach and
Rosenstiel, p. 22). In his later book The Public and Its Problems, he postulated that with
an increase in interaction and communication between citizens there is a natural
outgrowth of democratic government(Kovach and Rosenstiel, p. 23). We see that
journalism and democratic government are linked in a special, complementary way in
Dewey’s writings.
§3.3 Journalism and Ethics
There are several prevalent texts on systems ofjournalistic ethics which we see as
curriculum time and time again. These books are often found on the syllabi of college
courses on the subject, and,though it is emphasized in such classes that students
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formulate their own code ofjournalistic ethics, this should not be taken in a Nietzschean
sense. For example,the principle that is most prevalent among contemporary journalists
in that it is the most universally accepted is that “Journalism’s first obligation is to the
truth.” (Kovach and Rosenstiel, p. 36) Other principles such as “Journalism’s first
loyalty is to the citizens”(Kovach and Rosenstiel, p.52) and “Journalists must
maintain an independence fi-om those they cover”(Kovach and Rosenstiel, p.l 18)
may even interact in interesting ways when,for instance,journalists are covering groups
or factions ofthose very citizens.
Under any level of subjectivity ofjournalistic ethics, there could be some
inconsistency between journalists’ individual ethical decisions while working for the
same news organization. Two journalists working for the same organization and faced
with the same ethical dilemma may conceivably reach two very different conclusions as
to an acceptable course of action. This is why we see in the journalism market that many
ofthese
professional news organizations have an established professional code of ethics which all
new employees must agree to abide by. There are several possible explanations for this
fact; however, we are most concerned with matters ofreputation.
The explanation which is most directly involved with our discussion is that of
reputation. If a professional news network has this code of ethics, then it may be used as
a form of non-price competition. A news network adheres to some principle or code of
principles which leads to a pattern of action or decision making which a target audience
finds admirable or desirable. This adherence increases the probability with which
members ofthat audience expect that news network to adhere to these principles in the
future.

27

As Robert Nozick approaches the topic in The Nature of Rationality, individuals
sometimes adhere to certain principles to establish a reputation which will greater
guarantee some behavior in the future(Nozick, p.10-11). Nozick goes further in saying
such individuals will hold to more concrete principles which can easily be applied to the
situation (Nozick, p. 11). If I am trying to establish a reputation with a particular target
audience, then I will want them to readily see the principle at work in my decision
making process, how it pairs with the facts ofthe situation, and I will want them to
extrapolate an expectation of my future decisions from this information.
The question we now face is whether to hold news reporters and commentators to
the same ethical standard. Are theyjournalists in the same sense? Some have argued
that if one classifies cable news commentators as journalists, then one must concede that
an independent blogger is a journalist. This is why we will say that cable news
commentators are journalists in that they work for a professional cable news network and
are, therefore, held to the same code ofjournalism ethics as their news counterparts at the
same network. This is a distinction which must be remembered for our examination in
chapter 7 and chapter 8.

‘7« any event, the proper question isn’t what ajournalist thinks is relevant but what his
or her audience thinks is relevant ”
-MICHAEL KINSLEY,political journalist and commentator
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Chapter 4: Redeflning the Relationship Between Ideas of Persuasion and Rhetoric
“Histories make men wise;poets, witty; the mathematics, subtle; naturalphilosophy,
-FRANCIS BACON
deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend.
When embarking on a discussion of persuasion and rhetoric, it is very easy to
degenerate into useless, semantical line drawing if one is not careful to pin down these
concepts. In the following section, we will offer a conception of persuasion. It is not our
intention to normatively establish that “persuasion” ought to be defined as we shall do so
here. It is also not our goal to define “persuasion” as most people, experts, or social
psychologists use the term. We merely offer a clear definition of how the term will be
used in this discussion so that we may draw up our arguments in such a way as to avoid
distracting quibbles over meaning. The remainder of this discourse will serve to show
this understanding of persuasion possesses considerable explanatory power and ties in
well with economic and psychological understandings ofindividual rationality.
§4,1 Defining Persuasion
One need only hear the word “persuasion” in certain contexts to conjure thoughts
ofincomplete information, deception, an amoral stratagem with the sole objective of
merely eliciting a certain physical, emotional, or mental response to a number ofcunning
moves within a system of pseudo logic. However,tracing the concept back to its origins
in ancient Greece, we find a change in attitudes as it was once thought to be necessary to
maintain social order.
We often find the conjunction of“persuasion” and “compulsion” in Plato’s
writings on the maintenance of order within a state(Morrow,p.234). In The Laws, the
Athenian frequently speaks ofthe true legislature persuading citizens to bend to the will
of the law, or, failing that, to compel them to do so. The purpose of persuasion in Plato’s
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dialogues is to lead to what he refers to as “the natural rule oflaw”(Plato, Laws, 690c)by
removing the necessity for force contra the exercise free will of citizens.
When examining rhetoric and persuasion in ancient Greece we must first
understand the meaning ofthe word within the context of ancient Greek society. IfeiGd)
may be translated as either “persuasion by fair means” or “talking over by foul means”
(Morrow, p. 235). In the later part of his life, Plato turned his efforts toward more cold
structuralizing as we see in The Laws in which he sets out an exhaustive list oflaws and a
education system meant to indoctrinate the youth into the belief and value system ofthe
state as reflected in said laws.
This system of education is meant to be produce capable soldiers, responsible
citizens, and willing adherents to the laws ofthe state. No one is to leave for other lands
unless the travel is approved and no favorable reports ofthe laws in other states are to be
allowed. This is an example of what we shall term persuasion contra animo ducendo for
it involves directing the development ofbeliefs, value systems, etc. held by one who will
later be led by persuasion. In less technical terms, it involves changing the core beliefs,
values, and assumptions of an individual in order to persuade that individual and may be
linked to the second meaning ofPlato’s preferred term,

This is what the layman

would term “brainwashing” and we see that it is truly persuasion “against a soul that will
be being led.” It is an interesting point that Plato uses such stmcture and definite
techniques while still utilizing words that often have connection with magic and sorcery
in his earlier works and in the writings of other Greek authors(Morrow, p.238-239). In
his article “Plato’s Conception ofPersuasion,” Glenn Morrow attempts to reconcile this
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magical aspect with the human capacity for reason. In speaking ofpersuasive preambles
for laws ofthe state he writes:
In saying that these are enchantments I do not wish to imply, nor I think
would Plato, that they make no appeal to reason. They are intelligently
persuasive; they are persuasion at the high level ofrational* insight
suffised with emotion.

(Morrow, p. 242)

There is still a love oftruth in Plato’s writings. In order for a rhetoritician to be
truly skilled in the art of persuasion, he or she must know the truths ofthe matters at
hand. Applied to our cable news pundits, a political commentator must,in order to be
persuasive, know the details of his party as well as other parties with which he is
competing in a dialogue. However,Plato takes this a step further. The type of
persuasion employed in his state is instructive in nature. Its purpose is to inculcate what
Plato considers to be true beliefs(Morrow,p. 243).
As in many topics, Aristotle offers a more practical view ofrhetoric in several of
his treatises. The major contribution one finds in his work, however, is the concept ofthe
enthymeme.^ A syllogism is an enthymeme if either a premise or its conclusion is
unexpressed; rather, it is excluded as it is thought to be manifestly apparent. For
example, a political commentator might say:

* Emphasis added
' Greek: 8V0up,Ti|4.a
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1. President Obama believes in government-run
healthcare AND govemment-nm healthcare would
decrease competition

Therefore: Mr. Obama should be voted out of
office in 2012.
This is reminiscent ofthe species of argumentation one hears being used by some
cable news commentators—albeit simplified for the purposes ofthe example. This is a
modem example of the enthymeme, because there is an assumed premise. We find that
2: “If any politician seeks to decrease competition, then that official should be voted out
of office” is one of our assumed premises.
What then is persuasion? We will say that each individual agent is selfpersuading in the sense that she actively strives for the completeness of her own being.
She accomplishes this by making decisions based on, or at least consistent with, her own
value-judgments, assumptions, and agreed facts. She chases after her desires, hopes, and
dreams. She flees firom her fears and trepidations. She continually strives for the
completeness of her being in that she looks to protect and foster her own self-interest^.
We may,however, take it a step fiirther by borrowing firom Italian philosopher Carlo
Michelstaedter.^
Let us say that men and women are self-persuading in that whenever they are a
respondent in a dialogue in which a speaker performs a speech act for the purposes of

t
As we will discuss in more depth in subsequent chapters, rational self interest in our sense means
individuals seek to adhere to their own principles, follow their own desires and often make probabilistic
judgments colored in some part by their own respective existential matrices.
^ Specifically, Michelstaedter’s Persuasion and Rhetoric.
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eliciting a particular action from the respondent or in order to gain approval from the
respondent for a particular policy, the success ofthat speech act hinges upon each
respondent’s existential matrix. The success or failure ofsuch a speech act relies upon
the fears, beliefs, values, experiences, prejudices etc. of each respondent. Essentially, we
are to understand persuasion as:
Persuasion: will be considered a process ofself-persuasion. This selfpersuasion is characterized by an agentpursuing her own desires, avoiding her
ownfears, and adhering to her own value-judgments and assumptions. This
activity determines action and processing ofinformation toformulate
conclusions.
Looking back to our enthymeme, we find a great candidate to serve as these
assumed premises. If a commentator were to assume agreement on one or more value
judgments by using them as imderstood premises in a chain argument, then the length of
the speech act could be drastically shortened. The conclusion ofsuch an argument would
owe its dependence to these assumptions, but the commentator is targeting specifically
those whose existential matrices which yield these beliefs.
We are not to believe, however, that these belief sets cannot be influenced or
altered by society. These beliefs are in some part a product of experience, society,
upbringing, etc. We see this in such areas as aesthetics, for there are differences in ideas
of beauty across various societies. People often have different fears. They often have
different passions. Essentially, humans assign value in ways that often shows the
possibility ofinfluence.
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§4.2 Rhetoric as the Art of Guiding Another’s Self-Persuasion
If we think of individuals as self-persuading, then how may an orator, politician.
or commentator be said to “persuade” that individual ofsomething? How do we account
for belief on the part ofthe orator that certain speech acts may elicit a certain, desired
response on the part of an individual respondent? One would be hard-pressed to argue
that such causation does not take place—^namely, that speaker X performs a speech act
with the goal of getting respondent Y to accept proposition A which she would not
otherwise accept, and respondent Y accepts proposition A. Similarly, a speaker X may
also perform a speech act with the goal of getting respondent Y to perform some action B
which she would otherwise not perform, and the respondent Y performs the action B.
The definition of rhetoric with which we will continue our discussion will account
for this. Our concept shall be the following:
Rhetoric: rhetoric is the art and science ofan agent X performing a speech act
or acts which affect the momentum and direction ofthe self-persuading/striving a
respondent with the result that the respondent accepts a proposition A or
performs an action B—that acceptance or action being the agent 5 goalfor her
rhetoric speech act(s).
§4.3 Rational Self-Interest and Rhetoric Yield Economic Considerations
With these distinctions between rhetoric and persuasion, we are beginning to
reach a point in our discussion at which it will be necessary to discuss individual
rationality, competing desires, and Robert Nozick’s theories of principles in rationality.
Since we understand persuasion as a type ofself-persuasion and have included value-

4>«

We have already touched upon these theories in Chapter 4’s discussion of reputation as an explanation of
professional codes of ethics for cable news networks.
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judgments and assumptions, one may raise the question as to how we account for an
individual with conflicting value-judgments, assumptions, and desires. This potential
weakness will be addressed in chapter 7’s discussion ofrationality and preferred desires.

“In my experience, there is only one motivation, and that is desire. No reasons or
principle contain it or stand against it."
-JANE SMILEY,Pulitzer-prize winning American novelist
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Chapter 5: Exposure to Diverse Views and Defining a “Reasonable” Political View
"Common sense tells us that this explosion ofmedia sources should eliminate any
concern over a lack ofdiversity ofviews in the marketplace and competition."
-FREDERICK UPTON,Congressman
Michigan 6^ Congressional District
Part ofthe American mentality is the beliefthat we, as a nation, are very open to
free speech. There is a sentiment ofopenness in the United States. There is a feeling of
freedom. We see this heavy reliance on free speech as a doctrine in the writing of U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Holmes. “The very aim and end ofour institutions is just
this: that we may think what we like and say what we think.” This freedom ofspeech is
important for our discussion, in that it is necessary to discuss free speech in the context of
our democratic discourse touched upon in previous chapters.
For those in academic pursuits who participate in the logical, scientific, or
otherwise scholarly discourse of their respective disciplines, the freedom to posit ideas is
useful, as it opens those ideas to scmtiny and comparison with competing ideologies,
theorems, etc. Through this process, ideas are continually tested and filtered.
§5.1 Mill on Competing Beliefs
John Stuart Mill contended further that any belief ought to be placed in the arena
with other competing theories. Through this process, Mill argued, incorrect beliefs may
be corrected or cast aside. If a beliefis found to be correct after such exposure, that
belief is seen with a “clearer perception and livelier impression ofthe truth.”(Mill, p.l6)
Much of what Mill has to say in his treatise On Liberty has great application to our
definition of democratic discourse.
Mill argues for freedom of speech by contending that society loses something
even if an opinion most consider to be false is suppressed. The argument here is that if
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such an opinion is juxtaposed with another, no matter how unlikely true one may be,then
the stronger or more true opinion will benefit. The reason offered is that this gives the
those holding that opinion a livelier perception ofthe truth.
How does one decide which opinions are “more true” or better than others? Upon
examination, it is clear that Mill’s theories hold ifideas are discussed and compared
through democratic discourse. Our notion of democratic discourse appears to exclude the
possibility, however, that citizens can discuss value-judgments independent offacts and
assumptions. This is not a problem as it is due to semantical classifications rather than
any inconsistency or contradiction and so it cannot be a point ofrebuttal.
Mill further posits that no view can be cast aside and left out of
discourse/discussion as “we can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to
stifle is a false opinion (Mill, p.l6).” Here is a point at which our theories and definitions
will have more power than that of Mill, as we may remove such opinions as false under
our conceptions. Mill cannot.
Our definition of a reasonable political view will allow for the removal of any
opinion which has an internal contradiction. At the end ofthis chapter, we will offer a
definition for these two terms (i.e. reasonable political view and internal contradiction)
and will, as a result, provide a means by which an interlocutor may find another view to
be internally contradictory.
Now that we have briefly discussed some of Mill’s comments and theories on free
speech and diversity of opinion, we move on to a more contemporary article on self
segregation of political views. Does Mill’s competition and comparison between ideas
actually take place and is it facilitated by the news media and commentary?
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§5.2 Mutz and Martin on Mass Media “Facilitating Communication Across Lines
of Political Difference”
In an article written for the March 2001 edition of The American Political Science
Review, Diana Mutz and Paul Martin make use of several surveys and other texts to show
that national media—in the form of print, broadcast, etc.—increase exposure of
individuals to political views differing from their own. Pointing to several studies, they
contend that individuals segregate within residential areas based on political views.
Mutz and Martin write that diversity of experience is said to be positively related
to awareness of oppositional viewpoints and political tolerance. They go on to write that
“in political theory and empirical work,there is near unanimous agreement that exposure
to diverse political views is good for democracy and should be encouraged... and these
processes are of a higher quality when people are exposed to dissimilar perspectives.”
(Mutz and Martin, p. 97)
Once they feel they may expect the reader’s confidence that segregation in
interpersonal relations does occur with regularity, we come to the issue of selective
exposure in mass media. “Few concepts have played as important a role in the history of
research on mass media communication as the notion that people selectively expose
themselves to like-minded media content.” (Elihu Katz, as quoted in Mutz and Martin, p.
98) Mutz and Martin set this issue aside. “Evidence of selective exposure in
interpersonal relations is incontrovertible, but it is less clear with respect to the news
media.” (Mutz and Martin, p. 98) There is a reason, however, not to discard the
possibility of selective exposure in mass media. If selective exposure in mass media
takes place on a significant scale, then there could be an economic incentive to offer
biased coverage or more commentary with a bias in ideologies offered.
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Then Mutz and Martin move on to the topic of perceived bias in the media in
offering “at least [a] very narrow range of opinions and arguments on public issues.”
(Mutz and Martin, p. 98) They offer as a defense that there is doubt that interpersonal
communication environments are “any less parochial or provide greater diversity.”(Mutz
and Martin, p. 98) This does not address the issue at hand, because whether the media is
biased is independent of whether there is diversity in interpersonal communication.
If we assume journalists and cable news networks are held to a standard of
objectivity and fair coverage then we see just how much the above argument misses the
point. This assumption is a major component ofjournalistic ethics, and must, therefore,
be addressed before a critique is offered by Mutz and Martin; however, no such reference
is made. There is mention of“pressures to reflect public opinion,” but the authors offer
the argument that despite such pressures,“the [national] news media are not subject to
the more narrow geographic constraints offace-to-face relationships, and they do not
reflect the structurally dictated homogeneity ofimmediate neighborhoods or
communities”(Mutz and Martin, p. 99). There are several problems with the above
arguments which must be addressed. We must do this not to establish that the views
posited by Mutz and Martin are, by necessity, false, but rather, our intention is to see if
we may demonstrate several weakness in their assertions.
To begin, let us assume people do segregate naturally between geographical
locations—namely, by residential area. Further, let us assume that citizens have less
exposure to the views of other peoples in these environments than they would if
connected to a more external world of beliefs, ideals, etc. Would this mean more diverse
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opinions being represented in national elections directly and the political environment
indirectly!
§5.3 Potential Weakness in Mutz and Martin
Despite surveys and studies cited in the article indicating increasing segregation
in residential areas—with respect to political views—^there are issues which are not
addressed at all. Either we are assuming individuals have the ability to accurately gauge
the political views of their neighbors and associates or we are relying on the accuracy of
the surveyors when developing and examining questionnaires which have a finite number
of categories and responses for something as complex as the continuum of each
individual’s political beliefs. Thus, we have not been sufficiently convinced that such
segregation does, in actual fact, exist; however, we will assume that this study holds for
the sake of following their discussion further. There is no substantive discussion of what
level, quality, or accuracy of“awareness” of varying political views is offered.
The topic of conditioning and the altering of opinion has been an area of much
study and interest in the past decade. It is not difficult to understand that, being our
looking glass to the outside world, the media is in a position of great power for potential
influence. When a commentator, for example, is preparing a segment on the war in
Afghanistan, she and any guests may be forced to cut away what they feel to be less
important material and to simplify the arguments as we have previously discussed. This
is both to cut dovm to the limited amount oftime they have to discuss a particular issue
and to package it in a digestible form for the demographic, her target audience. Just as
Lippmann would argue, they are preparing more manageable representations ofreality,
which are by their very nature incomplete and flawed to some degree.
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If an individual’s environment, experiences, and the pressures ofsociety may in
some way create or alter beliefs or values, we are faced with a the problem in one ofthe
arguments we touched upon previously. Specifically,(a)ifindividuals can be
conditioned by mass media messages AND(b)if people self-segregate geographically as
Mutz and Martin argue, then we can create a model which would lead to some
equilibrium point of political doctrines in the U.S. This will not contradict Mutz and
Martin’s claim that mass media has the ability to expose individuals to more political
views than would be possible within their geographic locale. It instead illustrates the
potential sacrifice that is made when entities such as cable news networks begin making
the transition to reporting on and representing political views.
§5.4 Offering Working Criteria for a “Reasonable” Political View
Before constructing our model of political views collapsing to some equilibrium.
we will first outline what we will call a “reasonable view” within the context of
democratic discourse. This view will facilitate our process of democratic discourse by
ensuring completeness ofinformation and a maximum level ofunderstanding points of
fnction between competing views and ideologies. In order to achieve this level of
efficiency we call any political view reasonable for citizen Q if all ofthe following
conditions hold:
(a) The view is consistent with all the facts available to citizen ,the holder of
the belief, at the time ofthe discourse. By consistent with the facts, we mean
precisely that there exists no argument to which citizen Q subscribes which makes
use of an assumption or uses a premise which contradicts an established fact.
(b) There exists some argument for that belief which has some correspondence
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with at least one relevant fact. There is a correspondence with a fact ifthere
exists an argument, to which citizen Q subscribes, for the view in question which
uses that fact as a premise and it is, therefore, included in the dependence set of
the conclusion/view.
(c) Citizen Q is able to identify any value-judgments and assumptions he makes
in his arguments. This is for his benefit and that of other participants in the
democratic discourse, since this ensures complete information for the sake of
debate.
Further developing this definition, we claim that all these reasonable views may
be broken down to any combination offacts, assumptions, and value judgments. We will
take time here to define an assumption in this context in addition to giving a definition for
value judgment.
These constituent “facts” to which we are referring are any propositions to which
all participants in a particular democratic discourse agree. They are “facts” within the
context of a specific democratic discourse. Additionally, a value judgment deals with
questions of worth, preference, or ordering. For example, a particular interlocutor may
have the value judgment that a life ofscholarship is more noble than a life of warfare.
We define an assumption as any premise which claims causation, correlation,
makes a prediction, offers a simple counter-factual, or any statement which includes a
fact such that the resulting claim is not, itself, a fact. Examples of assumptions ofthis
sort may include any theorem of Keynesian economics as well as the most established
postulates of behavioral psychology.
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With large groups of citizens participating in the democratic discourse facilitated
by cable news mediums, our definition of a fact excludes many propositions which may
seem common sense to the vast majority ofthe population. Under our conception, if one
of a thousand citizens does not subscribe to the truth of a particular proposition, then it is
not considered a fact; however, we will see as individuals self select into more
homogeneous groups this standard is not so difficult to meet.

‘7 don't know ofanybody's political bias at CBS News. We try very hard to get any
opinion that we have out ofour stories, and most ofour stories are balanced."
-LESLEY STAHL, American journalist and CBS reporter
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Chapter 6: Chaining Arguments and Understood Premises
“Remember that what pulls the strings is theforce hidden within; there lies the power to
persuade, there the life — there, ifone must speak out, the real man.“
■Marcus Aurelius
Leading a respondent in a dialogue to accept (or reject) a particular proposition or
to take (or refrain from taking) a certain action is often not a simple logical step. With
complex social and political arguments, we find it is seldom (if ever) a quick deductive
move. This is clear to us at this stage of our discussion as we have chosen to define
persuasion as a process of self-persuasion—^respondents following their interests and
utilizing their assumptions, value judgments, etc. Additionally, under our conception,
since persuasion (and, therefore, rhetoric) relies so heavily on subjective existential
matrices, it is clear why commentators would have an incentive to draw many of these
components into their analysis when targeting a particular group. That is not the only
appeal, however. These also allow commentators to shorten cumbersome arguments to
be presented to a mass audience for the purposes of persuasion and ratings.
With the complexity of social and political issues and the large amount of
information which may be included in argumentation on this matters, we must define a
very powerful species of argument. The chain argument is a strong tool in logic. Every
student who has completed proofs in an elementary logic class has a degree of exposure
to this type of argumentation. Chain argumentation is useful in that it allows for the truth
(or high probability of the truth) of premises to be carried over great expanses to establish
the truth (or high probability of the tmth) of a conclusion.

44

§6.1 Defining a Chain Argument and Chaining Argumentation
We may offer the following definition of a chain argument

suh-conclusions.

It will serve the common understanding ofthis concept for later discussion if and how
such chain arguments are used in cable news commentary.
CHAIN ARGUMENT: an argument in which there is at least one sub-conclusion. Any
sub-conclusions are in turn used to establish either other sub-conclusions or the endconclusion.
SUB-CONCLUSION: any proposition which serves as a premise in a chain argument
and owes its dependence to one or more premises in that argument.
END-CONCLUSION: the proposition which a chain argument is meant to establish and
which marks the end of the chain argument.
We may construct an elementary chain argument for the sake of an example:
1. If it is raining outside, then the ground is wet. {1}
2. The ground is not wet. {2}
3. If it is not raining, then there is no thunder. {3}
4. Either there is thunder or there’s a race at the track. {4}
5. If there is no rain and there is a race at the track, then Bob is in the stands. {5}
6. It is not raining. M.T. on 1&2 {1,2}
7. There is no thunder. M.P. on 3&6 {1,2,3}
8. There must be a race at the track. D.S. on 4&7 {1,2,3,4}
9. There is no rain AND there is a race at the track. CONJ. on 6&8 {1,2,3,4}

(END-)CONCLUSION: Bob is in the stands. M.P. on 5&9 {1,2,3,4,5}
Noted logician Douglas Walton gives a thorough consideration to chain
arguments and their place in media argumentation in his 2007 text MEDIA
ARGUMENTATION: Dialectic. Persuasion, and Rhetoric. On the subject of chain
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arguments and persuasion he contends:
the speech act of persuasion is typically not a one-step process. Instead,
it starts out with one small step of argument, and then proceeds through a
series of connected steps forming a chain of argumentation...this step-bystep process is fundamental to the notion of persuasion dialogue.
(Walton, p.56-57)
Walton finds chain argumentation so essential to what he terms “persuasion
dialogue” that he includes it in his Third Definition ofPersuasion:
The proponent persuades the respondent to accept a designated
proposition A as true if and only ifthe proponent puts forward a chain of
argumentation meeting the following requirements. First, each step, or
single inference in the chain [of argumentation], is a structurally correct
argument according to some appropriate requirements set out in the
opening stage ofthe dialogue. Second, the premises ofthe argument are
all propositions that are already commitments ofthe respondent in the
dialogue or are propositions that he can tentatively accept or be gotten to
accept by argument later in the dialogue. Third, the ultimate conclusion^
of the chain of argument, at the final step ofinference, is proposition A.
(Walton,p. 87-88)
§6.2 Shortening Chain Arguments for Cable News Commentary
If chain arguments are a necessity, then we are still faced with an issue for
television commentators who wish to use them—^time is still a major factor. It cannot be

* Emphasis added
^ This “ultimate conclusion” meaning the same as the end conclusion of our definition.
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ignored that the commentator must distill complex social and political arguments down to
a discourse which may only last several minutes. Where can a commentator condense
these chain arguments down into manageable breaks while still retaining their persuasive
power under Walton’s “third definition” above?
Where can she remove sub-conclusions or even premises while the argument still
performs its desired function of leading the respondents to individually persuade
themselves of such and such an end-conclusion? As we have theorized, the most
appealing answer for this is the use ofsome assumptions and value-judgments ofa
particular demographic as premises, whether stated or understood, in her argumentation.
If she uses an assumption (or value-judgment) as a stated premise in her argument instead
of a sub-conclusion, then this shortens the length ofthe chain, but if this assumption (or
value-judgment) is generally agreed upon in the demographic she is targeting, then the
strength of the argument in the eyes of her viewers does not suffer significantly even
though she does not provide an argument for that statement. This is because sub
conclusions which would need justification themselves in other contexts, with other
respondents, can simply be stated or even understood. Experience and society has
already done the job of convincing.
If, on the other hand, she uses such an assumption (or value-judgment) as an
understood premise, then each viewer in her target demographic will naturally bridge any
gap in reasoning—if,indeed, he notices one which could easily be addressed by a
relevant assumption or value judgment. Noting our definition of afact in the context ofa
reasonable political view, we see an interesting characteristic as democratic discourse is
seen within more precisely determined demographics. Our concept of a fact, which
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excluded any proposition not unanimously agreed upon, demands a more attainable
criterium. As a commentator more precisely targets particular demographics of political
view, there is an increasing amount of agreement whatever issue(s) is the standard for
judgment. Thus, more propositions come closer to this required unanimity.

''Logic is like the sword—those who appeal to it shallperish by it.”
—SAMUEL BUTLER,English essayist and critic
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Chapter 7: Individual Rationality, Accounting for Competing Desires, and the
Vividness Bias
“By the way, the point between rationality and what we would call the irrational is a very
difficult point to establish. There's no specific line, as you know."
--LEO ORNSTEDSf,20^ century experimental composer
In the disciplines of psychology and economics there has been a good deal of
work on the topic of individual rationality. Economists and psychologists agree human
beings are rational in some sense despite frequent differences in the interpretation ofthe
meaning of this rationality(Simons,s209). Thus, the disagreement comes in the question
of the sense in which human beings are rational.
§7.1 Cognitive Psychology and Economics of Rationality
Much economic theory concerns itself with the behavior ofrational individuals
within certain game models, market constructions, and other specified conditions. This
assumption of individual rationality is made in order to create a level of homogeneity in
terms of thought, goals, or decision-making processes. Often this assumed universal goal
is to maximize monetary gains, but the skillful economist can account more for
differences between subjective tastes, abilities, and desires by building more complexity
into a model or game. However,in the absence ofsuch complexity,the purpose ofthese
assumptions of homogeneity is to allow for predictability of actions for any member of a
specified group.
Cognitive psychologists discuss this idea ofrationality with greater focus on
procedural rationality(Simon, s211). This procedural rationality is also represented in
some economic game theory and pairs nicely with our definition ofa reasonable political
view. The following is how economist and psychologist Herbert Simon describes
procedural rationality:
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The rational person ofcognitive psychology goes about making his or her
decisions in a way that is procedurally reasonable in the light ofthe
available knowledge and means ofcomputation.
(Simon,s211)
Simon sees fundamental differences between the economist’s assumption of
rationality and the psychologist’s conception, but there is also common ground on which
to stand. Experts from both fields would concede individuals have reasons for what they
do. As Freud would agree, there is mind and method in even madness.(Simon,s209) In
fact, some economic theory is closer to the cognitive psychologist’s rationality.
Game theory takes into account that different players in a game can have different
information sets, different desires, and different beliefs another player’s rationality.
strategies, or the beliefs of other players. Economist Joel Watson offers an explanation of
a game theorist’s assumption of individual rationality.
Game-theoretic analysis generally rests on the assumption that each player
behaves according to his preferences. More precisely, we can assume that.
if a player’s action will determine which ofseveral outcomes will occur in
a game, then this player will select the action that leads to the outcome he
most prefers. This is the mathematical definition ofrationality.
(Watson, p.45)
Under Watson’s definition, rationality concerns a type oflogic or reliability in
successfully seeking the maximization ofthe fulfillment ofsome desire. We say that
player 1 has a desire for the A if his utility for A is greater than zero. This desire is not
necessarily to maximize monetary gain—as is often the case in economic analysis and
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strategy. It may be player 1 ’s desire to maximize the monetary gains ofanother player.
In this case, he can be expected to follow strategies for this purpose under certain
parameters even if it lowers player 1 ’s own expectation of monetary gain(Watson,p. 45).
§7.2 Fulfillment of Desires and Competing Principles
If player 1 desires money but desires to maximize the monetary gain ofthe other
player more, then we say that to maximize the other player’s monetary gain is a preferred
desire for player 1. To state this in quantitative terms, desire A is a preferred desire
relative to desire B if the maximum possible fulfillment of desire A yields a higher payoff
p>q where q is the payoff of maximum possible fulfillment of desire B. The maximum
fulfillment of a desire is defined as the maximum payoff possible for pursuing the
fulfillment ofjust that desire within a game. We will illustrate this distinction with the
following elementary example:
Consider a game in which Andrew has two competing desires: 1)he desires to do
well on a test tomorrow and 2) he desires to go to the movies tonight. Ifhe
chooses to go to the movies, he can see one movie or two movies tonight. Ifhe
sees one movie, then his test score tomorrow will be a B. Ifhe sees two movies,
then his test score tomorrow will be a C. Ifhe does not go to the movies tonight.
then his test score tomorrow will be an A. For every letter grade above a Che
gets an additional payoffof15 units offulfillment. His payofffor watching one
movie is 16 units offulfillment, but his payofffor watching a second movie is only
10 additional units offulfillment. We will convert this to a decision treefor the
purposes ofillustrating the point.
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S: studyfor the test
N: do not studyfor the test
Mi: go to one movie
Mi: go to nvo movies
a: Andrew
Note on Payoffs: the payoffs in thefollowing decision tree take theform (myn) where
m is payoffin units offulfillmentfrom a test grade above a C, and n is the payoffin
units offulfillmentforgoing to the movies.
(30,0)

(15,16)

(0,26)
(0,16)

We see that the maximum payoff m for series of decisions is 30 units of
fulfillment, and the maximum payoff n for any series of decisions is 26 units of
fulfillment. Thus, studying (that is, doing well on the test) is a preferred desire to going
to the movies under our definition. We also see that if we add m and n for each payoff,
then we have a maximum aggregate payoffin units offulfillment when Andrew studies
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after seeing one movie and makes a B on the test. Ifthese units offulfillment of desire
are universal from desire to desire then Andrew will choose to see one movie and make a
B on the test. How do we account for his decision if Andrew nonetheless chooses to
forego the movies and make an A on the test? We may define yet another useful concept
to address this gap.
If Ajidrew seeks to attain the maximum fulfillment of his desire to do well on the
test rather than seek to maximize aggregate units offulfillment (i.e. regardless of which
desire is fulfilled) despite the fact that doing so will yield 1 less unit of aggregate
fulfillment, then we say that his desire to do well on the test is a strictly preferred desire.
The discontinuity in theory here is that, economically, if Andrew is rational, then a move
to make an A on the test tomorrow would not make sense under our game model as it
stands.
Let us say that if desire A is strictly preferred to desire B for player 1, then there
is some multiplier a such that Ei’[maxF(A)]= o£i[maxF(A)]*. That is, the payoffto
player 1 for pursuing the maximum fulfillment of desire A is Ei[maxF(A)], but for the
purposes of decision making—to decide whether to mix strategies and pursue both
desires or to pursue some other desire entirely—the revised value Ei’[maxF(A)]=
oEi[maxF(A)] is compared with Ei[maxF(B)] and Ei[mixF(A,B)]^
To apply this to our previous game,if Andrew is player 1 and desire A is the
desire to do well on the test while desire B is the desire to see a movie then we have the
following identities:

Where a is some constant such that a G K

^ El[mixF(A,B)] is the maximum payoff to player 1 (in units offulfillment) firom a mixed
pursuit/consideration of desires A and B.
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a. Ei[maxF(A)] = 30 units of fulfillment
b. Ei[maxF(B)] = 26 units of fulfillment
c. Ei[mixF(A,B)] = 31 units of fulfillment
Since Ei[mixF{A,B)] > Ei[maxF(A)], Andrew takes a mixed pursuit ofdesires A
and B iffdesire A is not a strictly preferred to desire Bfor Andrew.
If on the other hand, Andrew is rational and still seeks to maximize thefulfillment
ofdesire A, then there must exist some asuch that a >

El[mixF(A,B)]
£l[maxF(i4)]’

Looking back to our brief discussion of Nozick’s theories on principles held by
rational agents, we may also apply these distinctions to his assertions. Nozick argues for
the use of principles to overcome temptation to break from a particular pattern of
behavior or decision-making; however, he also states that they are not always an absolute
guard against it (Nozick, p. 14-16). In a similar fashion to our above discussion of
strictly preferred desires, he postulates that individuals may discount the benefits/gains of
breaking from a principle, but when the benefit from breaking a principle is great enough,
a rational agent will compromise that principle. Each rational agent may have his or her
own subjective or arbitrary discount, but our sense ofrationality as procedural in nature
still applies.
Now that we have illustrated the difference between a preferred desire/principle
and a strictly preferred desire/principle, there is one more concept we must present before
moving on to the vividness bias. We must account for the possibility that a rational
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player 1 holds a principle $ and any principle A such that there exists no asuch that it is
the case that:
Q£i[maxc(4>)] > Ei[maxc(A)] AND oEi[maxc(^)]>Ei[mixc($^)]^
and player 1, nonetheless, chooses to pursue the maximum fulfillment ofprinciple
We would say this Kantian player chooses to adhere to principle$ because she thinks it
the right or correct to do so—this despite her own interests. In this case, we say that
principle

is an absolutely preferred desire or principle.

For a player 1 with principle 4> absolutely preferred to principle A,we say her
expected value of maximization and mixed strategies in units ofcompliance looks like
the following for the purposes of decision-making:
5Ei[maxc(^)]> Ei[maxc(A)] AND 6Ei[maxc(4>)] >Ei[mixc(^>,A)]
where for any 5 we have that:
El[maxC(A)] El[mixC(«i>jV)]
}.
El[maxC(<l>)] ’ El[maxC(<i>)]

6 > max{

Thus, player 1 never chooses to mix adherence or to maximize another principle without
regard to any increases in payoff for an alternate strategy.
§7.3 Vividness Bias and Television News
The vividness bias or “vividness criterion” as it has been called refers to the
tendency of individuals to give greater weight to facts or events which they have seen,
witnessed, or experienced (Heuer, p.l 16). Does this bias apply to individuals who do not
directly experience an event or fact? Does an individual give more deductive or
inductive import to an event the individual experiences indirectlyby watching a video
capturing its occurrence? Clearly, if it is the case that the vividness bias applies also to
t

Note that, when speaking of maximization and mixed strategies directed at principles,
we instead use units ofcompliance.
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such indirect experience, then it will have some significance in our discussion by giving
us an example of an irrational bias that viewers ofcommentary shows may share.
If this bias does include indirect experience, then consider two forms ofnews
commentary. Consider a newspaper editorial and a segment on a cable news commentary
show. Assume that both contain the same factual information, their sequence ofpoints is
ordered in the same way, etc. If the television program includes relevant video, pictures,
etc. as part of its discussion of the issue at hand, then, applying the vividness bias, it will
tend to be more persuasive to an audience in that members ofthe target audience will
tend to give more power to the evidence it offers.
We are now prepared to proceed to the construction ofour economic model ofthe
market for cable news commentary. Our definitions for persuasion and rhetoric, our two
conceptions of rationality from this chapter, and our distinction classifications of
preferred principles, strictly preferred principles, and absolutely preferred principles will
serve to examine the behavior and ethical decision-making ofcable news commentators
within our economic model.

“The inspiring talker produces zeal, whose intensity depends not on the rationality of
what is said or the goodness ofthe cause that is being advocated, but solely on the
propagandist’s skill m using words in an exciting way."
-ALDOUS HUXLEY,essayist and author
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Chapter 8: Economic Analysis and Constructing a Game Theoretical Model
“/« terms ofthe game theory, we might say the universe is so constituted as to maximize
play. The best games are not those in which all goes smoothly and steadily toward a
certain conclusion, hut those in which the outcome is always in doubt.”
--GEORGE B. LEONARD,writer and editor
Over the course of this thesis, we have focused primarily on terms and
philosophical assessment. We have proposed definitions for these terms and concepts
which carry significant explanatory force. Our concepts of persuasion and rhetoric have
been examined, and we have begun to intertwine the two to create a theory ofspeech acts
yielding a desired behavior on the part of the respondent. We have also demonstrated
how these concepts may be used to understand actual political argumentation in cable
news commentary.
Perhaps more importantly, we have offered a definition for what we have termed
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democratic discourse. It is the purpose of this thesis to assess the effect cable news

commentary can have on this democratic discourse, but to this point in our discussion we
have only been dealing with potentiality and laying a groundwork ofconcepts. Now,we
move to the question of whether cable news networks have an actual economic incentive
to target a particular demographic.
Making a few simplifying assumptions and defining several parameters, we now
construct a game theoretical model to see if there are any economic incentives at play
here. We are not contending or asserting in any way that the market for cable news
political and social commentary looks like our model. Instead, we construct it with the
goal of providing a glimpse into the temptations and incentives facing rational agents
under the same or similar conditions. In this chapter, a theoretical framework will be
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constructed which will be ready for application at such a time as another may establish
that there is some similarity between our model and actual markets.
§8.1 Beginning with a Simple Model
We will begin with a very simple construction of Xi,X2 significant political views
on issue Sk:
0

Assign a numerical value to each Xi and X2(where Xi < X2)

0

Let f(x)\ [0,oo) ^ [0,t]where t = max {f(Xi),f(X2)} and f(x)defines the
distribution curve of viewers’ stance on issue

Further, let f(x)be a bimodal

distribution and let f(Xi)& f(X2)be the two local maxima.
0

Assume that t = f(Xi)> f(X2).

0

Let a(x,b) describe a distance function such that ff(x,b)= x -b .

0

Let 6n.m = Xn+ /3n.m = X^- /5n.m SUCh that a(€ n,m >

Xn)

> Xm).

The bellow is our example of what such a distribution could look like:
Note: 60,1 =0

t

¥
0

X1

^1,2“ Xi+ /3i,2

X2
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(1)
Further, let the following conditions hold:

Jo^'^fMdx > C^^f(x)dx ^ io^f(x)dx > SnJ(x)dx
Similarly,

fix)dx => Qf(x)dx > /^'j'VWdx

(2)
Further, let the following hold;

fo^’^f(x)dx >

w+eO,i
w+e1,2
z+e0,1 f(_x)dx>lz+e1,2 f{x]dx

AND

C.2

> frfMdx => j;;^"nx)dx > /;;«/wdx
Note: Thisfor any z,we[0,Xi] and any w,yG[0,|8i J.*
Where w> z and u >y

* As with many of our parameters and conditions for this model, it should be understood that we are
constructing our distribution and laying out our rule in such a way as to make calculation and analysis as
palatable and seamless as possible. We leave it to the market analyst to assess in what ways our model may
or may not be representative of the actual market for cable news commentary. It is our hope that in the
interim our rules and this model will be as intuitively strong as possible when considered beyond
sometimes trivial (yet necessary) mathematical abstraction.
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Essentially, wc arc assuming that our distribution holds to the following:

(1)

t

I

»_
I

I
I

I
I

ii'/

B- ,1

i ir// A

\
X

0

A+B > C+D

X1

- X2 — ^12

X2

A > C AND C+D > A+B => D > B in the areas between the curve and
x-axis.
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We may also look to our distribution to understand how (2)applies when

C’^fix)dx > Q^f{x)dx
(2)

t

<
(j1

X,

P

fu

4>

X2

Where CO = z + 60,1
p = w + 60,1
</) = z + €1,2

7= w + 6i,2

§8.2 Adding Players to Our Game and Static Objectivity
0

Let P = some constant per viewer revenue.

0

Let Ni , N2, N3 represent three cable news networks competing in the market.

0

Let S1, S2, S3 be total cost for Ni,N2, N3respectively. This total cost is constant
and, therefore, independent of the number of viewers for the individual network.
We assume that each of the three networks has the same desire A for monetary

gain; assume further that each has a desire B to adhere to some principle T ofobjectivity
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or logical completeness in commentary argumentation. We assume this desire B to
adhere to principle T yields a payoff ofzero fulfillment for particular network ifthe
commentators of that network target a specific demographic (i.e. a target audience).
These commentators would do this by the means we have examined throughout this
thesis, but more specifically in our discussion of chain arguments in chapter 6. Such a
commentator would build into his arguments the assumptions, value-judgments, and (in
some cases) the agreed-upon facts of a particular group without enumerating or
discussing them for the effective practice of democratic discourse. Assume that each of
the three networks receives one third of the viewership IVil = Vi°^^ +V2°^^ +V3°*’^ when
each holds to F

that is, one third of the total area beneath the curve rounded to the

nearest integer.

1^ l=v,°'’J= V2°^>= V3“'’Vhere;

v,=/„"/Wd^
If none of the three networks focus on a mode,then they have the following
revenues Rj(i=l,2,3 ):
Rj°'>j=p*v2»W

Rl'>l'J=p*VjObj

R/'>i=p*V3'''’'
Clearly,

=R3°’’' since v,*j= V2°*'''= V3*l

With this uniform revenue, we still see there is a potential for differences between
the networks’ respective profits—represented here as

to networks

Ni,N2,N3 respectively.
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I1|°‘’J=P*V| -S|

n2°'j=P*V2-S2
n^=P*V3-S3

Note: It is csscnticd \rc’ see that, though they have the same revenue, the networks can
have different total costs Si.Sj.Ss which will yield different profits.
§8.3 Defining Rules for Targeting an Audience
Our game is sufficient, thus far, to provide us with such uniform revenues and
appertaining profit functions when all networks are adhering to the principle of
objectivity; however. we must define one more group ofrules to govern audience
targeting and its affect on market share in our model. Then we will move on to starting
the game and examininiz the incentives and motivations ofour three networks.

RULES OF THE GAME:
If network Nl(L=1,2,3) chooses to target a point nL6[0,oo]...
Consider a(Xq, nr)= min{(7(Xi, nL),(T(X2, nL),...,or(Xjt, nj} for some
{1,2,...

for k number of modes (that is, significant political views).

Then network Nl has viewership vl such that:
nL+i?q,q+l
VL=II /,nL-pq-l.q f(x)dx

II

Note: We call this the viewer domain o/Nl- Any network which continues to adhere to F
will evenly share any area not included in the viewer domain ofa network pursuing a
strategy ofbias with any other network(s) also adhering to F.
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IN THE EVENT THAT VIEWER DOMAIN OF TWO NETWORKS OVERLAP:
Let network Nm (M=1,2,3) choose to target a point nMG[0,oo]...
Further, Nm^N[
Then consider a(Xr, nM)= min{a(Xi, nM),a(X2,nM),...,a(X*,nM)} for some
rE{l,2

,A'} for k number of modes (that is, significant political views).

Then network Nm should have the following viewership:
nM+^r,r+l

Vm—II fnM-pr-l.r f(x)dx II
But what happens when we:

letVL=ll /^/(x)djc II and Vm=II

If VL+VM > II

f(x)dx\\ where a > b,c > d,a > d?

f(x)dx II then we say networks Nl and Nm have

overlapping viewer domains.
Ifthe viewer domains vl and v^ overlap, then 'Niand'i^miakethefollowingrevised
viewer domains:
nL+d

vr=ii rnL-pq-l,q f(x)dx II
nm+)?r,r+l

vm"^=II Xnm-d

f(x)dx II
Where d=
2

rev

In the event that ul= hm we say that Vl

vL

vM

2

Y = Vm .

rev

^ That is, Nm and Nl are not the same network.
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§8.4 Examining the Dynamics of Play
Now we move to a focus on the largest mode—that is, the most significant
political view. Let us assume that it is Xi. Then:

C'^f(x)dx > Qj^x)dx
For any network N,(/ = 1,2,3), if that neUvork targets nj= Xi then they have the
following revised profit function and viewer distribution graph:

n,bias =?*C^nx)dx-s,}
A

N1
t

>

0

Since

X2

f{x)dx >

W+£0,1

12/(^)

W+£l,2

which implies z+eO,l f(x)dx>S,z+e1,2 f(x)dx}
**

we may say network Nj maximizes viewership by focusing on Xi.
At this point in the analysis, we must call our attention again to the desire A
which all three of our networks Ni,N2,N3 has for monetary gain. Let us say that 11°^^ and
t

bias

We shall apply this term ITj to more general use as representing the profit gained by a network Nj
(j = 1,2,3,...) at point nj = Xg where g€{1,2,3,...,/:} for/: number of modes(i.e. significant political views).
^ See page 59.
This also maximizes profit as Sj is constant and, therefore, independent ofN,’s viewer domain.
^[Ilj] = P*Vi which clearly increases with Vj as P is our constant per viewer revenue.
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bias

Hi

yield a payoff in units of fulfillment ofdesire A which we will term S,'*' and
bias

respectively. Given our market model and a network Nj such that AXi

tt
>Ei[maxF(B)],

if[the management of] network N, is rational then Nj will focus onnpXi. However,
returning to our three networks, if the desire for monetary gain is a strictly preferred
desire for NuN:,N3 such that they have multipliers Q!i,af2,Of3^^ respectively then there must
be some resistance to the temptation of monetary gain^l
If we assume total costs S, for all the firms in the game are equal, we begin to see
an interesting pattern at work. We look for the Nc such that 0^= min(ai,0f2,0f3,..., ot)
where c is the number of players/networks in the market. So the network which has the
smallest multiplier (i.e., discounts the fulfillment of desire A less than all other networks)
will be the first to exhibit bias by focusing on the largest significant political opinion as
the potential for profits increases. This Ne is the first to reach a break point for adherence
to strictly preferred principle F.
Once Nc has reached this point and begins focusing on the most represented
political view, the other networks in the market evenly split the viewership outside ofthe
viewer domain of Nc between themselves. At this moment, we may make this model
even more interesting by also considering beliefs held by networks about other networks.
To do this, let us again focus on our simple model with Xi,X2 and networks Ni,N2,N3.
Next, assume Ni=Ne.

tt

Recall that desire B is the desire to adhere to principle F.
tt To reiterate a clarification of our discussion in chapter
7, these multipliers each serve for the conparison
between fulfillment of desire B to adhere to principle F of objectivity and the fulfillment ofdesire A for
monetary gain. They do not affect the payoff to a player/network.
This ties in nicely with Robert Nozick’s theory of principles which may be found in The Nature of
Rationality and has been discussed previously.
*** a “break point” being the point at which the multiplier a is too small to compensate and an individual
begins pursuing a mixed or other strategy than the maximization ofthe strictly preferred desire or principle.
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In this simple construction, what happens if N2 believes that N3 has an (X3 such
that N3 will soon choose to focus on X2? It may be that N2 will feel more temptation to
focus on X2 in an attempt to beat N3 to the mode. If N2 chooses to remain objective and
the beliefs are confirmed when N3 focuses on X2,then N2 will be left with V2 =0 since it
will have no viewer domain for as long as it remains objective. If, on the contrary, N2
does focus on X2 then N3 will be placed in a similar predicament. In either case,the
network which is last to remain objective will either have no viewership or will find some
point on the graph to focus to try and maximize profit.
§8.5 Addressing Potential Criticisms
A criticism which may be leveled against the very foundations of our analysis
deals with the distribution curve. How may we say that, if we assign numbers to
significant political views, there will always be people between these points? Must there
always be a middle area in political views? For example, how does our model offer any
conclusions in the event that all the viewers are either directly at Xi or X2? If this is the
case, our integration gives us zero. That there may be some political views on an issue
for which there is no logical compromise—^not gray area—is fair to concede; however,
this does not imply that individuals in the political public (our viewers) do not feel as if
they may have degrees of agreement with such political issues.
We have spent much of the last two chapters laying out a system for comparison
between desires/principles and even calculation of payoff, but one might also argue that a
theory which places so much upon a perceived assumption that human beings mentally
whether consciously or subconsciously—^perform these steps when going about their
decision making processes assumes too much. That human beings always reason in this
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way would be a very difficult proposition to establish—and would,in all likelihood be
found to be fruitless; however, that rational human beings perform steps and assessments
like those laid out in chapter 7 is a much sturdier theory which is difficult to disprove,
offers a very clear insight into decision-making, and fits very well with some existing
theories of principle and desire.
When speaking of cable news networks utilizing these calculations to reach a
decision of whether or not to exhibit bias, we confidently point to Aristotle’s theories of
collective decision making briefly discussed earlier in our discourse. Journalists,
commentators, and network executives at these networks may continually debate the
application of and adherence to journalistic codes of professional ethics. Applying
Aristotle, the decisions and actions of the network will tend to be more rational or
reasonable as their discussion grows in participants. Thus, it seems less of a task to argue
for the application of such calculations by groups ofimperfectly rational agents than by
the agents themselves (i.e., individually).
§8.6 Conclusion of Economic Analysis
In chapter 7, we explored several aspects of decision theory in addition to
postulating some of our own on the subjects ofcompeting desires and competing
principles. We applied these theories to journalistic codes of professional ethics and the
temptation to exhibit bias in the pursuit of profit.
Our economic model above has demonstrated that if a desire for adherence to a
principle of objectivity is a strictly preferred desire and there is a desire for monetary gain
for a particular network then there is a profit large enough that the network will
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compromise its principle of objectivity in order to pursue profit associated with
exhibiting bias.
As with many economic models, this is not to say we can now perfectly predict
the decisions of networks with regards to programming. To accomplish this, we would
be required to prove that the market for cable news commentary holds to our parameters
and we would be required to place a great deal of faith on the rationality ofindividuals
and groups of individuals. We can take away a new insight into the motivations and
temptations which affect rational individuals and rationally acting networks in the real
market.

"At the constitutional level where we work, 90percent ofany decision is emotional. The
rational part ofus supplies the reasonsfor supporting our predilections.”
“WILLIAM DOUGLAS,American jurisprudent and judge
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professional news organizations. These ethics were placed in light ofRobert Nozick’s
theories on principles as a means of establishing and holding a reputation.
Before proceeding to any more analysis, separate definitions ofpersuasion and
rhetoric were required. For the purposes of this thesis these two concepts were defined
as the following:
Persuasion: will be considered as a process ofself-persuasion. This selfpersuasion is characterized by an agent pursuing her own desires, giving due
consideration to her own principles, and adhering to her own value-judgments
and assumptions. This activity determines action and processing ofinformation
toformulate conclusions.
The above definition was further supplemented by our discussion ofindividual
rationality in chapter 7 as we grappled with the capacity of an individual to rationally
strive after the fulfillment of a particular goal. The second half ofour couplet oftemis,
rhetoric, was defined as:
Rhetoric: rhetoric is the art and science ofan agentperforming a speech
act or series ofspeech acts which affect the momentum and direction ofthe selfpersuading/striving a respondent with the result that the respondent accepts a
proposition A or performs an action B—that acceptance or action being the
agent’s goalfor her rhetoric speech act(s).
As Aristotle stated, rhetoric consists ofthe ability to recognize the available means of
persuasion. (Aristotle, Rhetoric^ Bk. I, 1355b 26-27)
Moving to chapter 5, we inspected some claims that national news media—
including cable news networks—increase diversity of opinion as people tend to be
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argument. These will be his understood steps or, at the very least, the argument for the
truth of these assumptions or value-judgments maybe excluded.
Chapter 7 served as a necessary component of our discussion and as a necessary
transition from a more philosophical analysis to an application of economic game theory.
In its pages we stated and assessed a traditional economic definition ofindividual
rationality as concerning a type of logic or understanding in seeking maximization ofthe
fulfillment of some desire—whether monetary, emotional, etc. We went on to find
several interesting consequences of this definition in that this notion ofindividual
rationality mixes well with our definition of persuasion. We took notice ofthe vividness
bias in decision making—a bias which has great significance in television news and
commentary as the audience is able to see pictures, graphs, etc. rather than lifeless
abstractions of policy. This involved theories from psychologists, intelligence analysts.
and economists.
As the last move in this thesis, we constructed a game theoretical model of a
market for cable news commentary. Under the assumptions of our model, we were able
to show an economic incentive to target a particular demographic. As with many
economic games, our goal was not to argue that the market for news commentary,in
actuality, looks like our construction. We sought only to see how rational agents behave
under our conditions.
Our discussion has provided a glimpse into the application ofphilosophy and
economics to cable news commentary and the business ofjournalism in democratic
government. We have also produced a very useful decision theory for conflicting desires
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and principles which not only ser\^d us in chapter 8’s economic analysis but which will
also prove fruitful in future enterprises.
As a final note, this thesis should serve as a call for more training and education
in the analytic arts. The most effective way to combat bias or irrationality is to become
conscious of the issue and to address it by means of intellectual robustness. The United
States requires rationally acting pools of voting citizens so that politicians and
government officials have a strong incentive to govern as rationally acting in the interests
of those groups of citizens and the US at large. The desire for knowledge and a principle
of the duty of citizenship has been one of the core pillars of American democratic
government and it must continue to be so if our government is to survive through the
winter.

“7 think, though, that people will read into a reporter's story a bias that they want to see
in a reporter. ”
-GARRETT GRAFF,editor-at-large of Washingtonian
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